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Abstract
Econophysics is a new and exciting cross-disciplinary research field that applies
models and modelling techniques from statistical physics to economic systems. It is not,
however, without its critics: prominent figures in more mainstream economic theory have
criticised some elements of the methodology of econophysics. One of the main lines of
criticism concerns the nature of the modelling assumptions and idealisations involved,
and a particular target are ‘kinetic exchange’ approaches used to model the emergence of
inequality within the distribution of individual monetary income. This paper will consider
such models in detail, and assess the warrant of the criticisms drawing upon the
philosophical literature on modelling and idealisation. Our aim is to provide the first steps
towards informed mediation of this important and interesting interdisciplinary debate, and
our hope is to offer guidance with regard to both the practice of modelling inequality, and
the inequality of modelling practice.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Econophysics and Its Discontents
The road that runs from physics to economics is an august and well travelled one.1 In the
modern context, we find that many of the models used in contemporary economics were
originally created by physicists, and many practitioners of contemporary economics were
originally trained as physicists. This is particularly true in financial economics.2 The term
‘econophysics’ is, however, intended to demarcate something new and different from such
inter-disciplinary transfers: rather it ‘describes the present attempts of a number of physicists
to model financial and economic systems using paradigms and tools borrowed from
theoretical and statistical physics’ (Stanley and Mantegna [2000], p. 355). Methodologically,
then, econophysics is supposed to differ from conventional economic practice in that it uses
the ‘paradigms and tools’ of statistical physics.3 Along with such an approach comes an at
least implicit criticism of the ‘paradigms and tools’ of conventional economics, including
those with their origin in earlier periods in statistical physics. After all, if the methods of
mainstream economics were not in some way deficient, why would it be necessary to call in
the econophysicists? The notion is that, methodologically speaking, mainstream economics
suffers from a number of defects that the practitioners of econophysics would like to correct.
Most importantly econophysicists argue that the core principles and models of mainstream
economic theory are not supported by the evidence of real economic data. Econophysics is
predicated on the assumption that models and modelling techniques drawn from an
experimentally focused and mathematically sophisticated science such as statistical physics
will give new, and more reliable insights. Not surprisingly, not all mainstream economists
agree with such a dismal view of their science. In particular, Gallegati et al. ([2006]) criticise
econophysics on the grounds that econophysicists are: i) redoing work which has been done
within mainstream economics; ii) ignoring rigorous and robust statistical methodology; iii)
assuming universal empirical regularities where there are none; and iv) using modelling
techniques that are in certain senses inherently problematic or illegitimate (see also McCauley
[2006]). The final line of criticism is the main focus of this paper, and we will consider in
particular the ‘kinetic exchange’ models for income distributions within populations that are
the subject of most ire within Gallegati et al. ([2006]).
Our intended role is as a mediator rather than a champion for either side in the debate. Our
hope is that by elucidating the sense in which the models in question can and cannot be taken
to be problematic one can understand more about the nature of the modelling practices and
idealisations used in the econophysics of social systems.4 Our analysis begins, in Section 1.2,
with a informal description of the econophysics models for income that we are dealing with.
Given that, we will introduce the principal ‘burglar economics’ line of criticism that has been
made of these models. Following this, in Section 2.1, we consider the wider context of models
for income in mainstream economic theory. In Section 2.2 we introduce the first econophysics
income model (the ‘DY’ model) in detail. We next move to isolate and evaluate the
1See Mirowski ([1992]) for an historical overview of the relationship between the two disciplines
2For a popular overview of the ‘Physics of Wall Street’ see Weatherall ([2013])
3As a matter of sociological fact, econophysicists typically publish in physics journals, rather than in eco-
nomics or finance journals (Gingras and Schinckus [2012]). For more on the history of econophysics, see Jo-
vanovic and Schinckus ([2013a]). For more on econophysics’ status as multi-, inter- or trans-disciplinary, see
Rosser, Jovanovic and Schinckus ([2010, 2013b]).
4For work focusing on the methodological foundations of financial econophysics see Kuhlmann ([2006,
2014]), Rickles ([2007, 2008]), Casini ([2014])
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idealisations involved in the DY model, by comparison with the (remarkably similar)
Boltzmannian gas model. In Section 4 we present a second, more sophisticated, econophysics
income model (the ‘CCM’ model) based upon a specific ‘de-idealisation’ of the the DY
model. Finally, in Section 5, we evaluate the connection between the foregoing analysis and
contemporary accounts of models and idealisations in physics and social science. Ultimately
our conclusion shall be rather an open one: There remain question marks regarding at least
some of the idealisations involved in the econophysics models. However, it remains to be seen
whether this indicates a shortcoming of the models or in adequacy of contemporary
philosophical work for dealing with the modelling practice of econophysics.
1.2 Against Burglar Economics
Consider the following two economic interactions:
Scenario 1: Two idealised economic agents bump into each other while carrying
with them all their income5 in cash money. All the money of both agents falls
onto the floor. They then each pick up a random proportion of the money on the
floor and go on their way.
Scenario 2: Two idealised economic agents each put a (possibly different) fraction
of their money in their back pocket. They then bump into each other and drop all
the money not in their back pockets onto the floor. They then each pick up a
random proportion of the total money on the floor and go on their way.
What can these types of randomised ‘zero intelligence’ economic interactions tell us about
real economic exchange processes? Surely nothing! Except for in a few extreme scenarios,
real economic interactions are almost entirely different, involving, as they do, things like
expectations, credit and risk aversion. The scenarios described above bear very little
resemblance to how economists usually think about microeconomic interactions.6 Rather, they
bear a very strong resemblance to how physicists think about microphysical interactions.
Scenario 1, in particular, is very similar to the type of randomised binary interaction that have
been used to build models of statistical systems since the mid-nineteenth century. Thus, it is
prima facie very surprising that models constructed along the lines of our two scenarios have
been used to recover important qualitative features of the distribution of individual monetary
incomes found within real economies. In particular, when aggregated over large populations,
kinetic exchange income models along the lines of the first scenario produce an exponential
distribution of incomes that corresponds to the bulk shape found within real data. And, when
aggregated over large populations, kinetic exchange income models with randomised savings
along the lines of the second scenario, produce an exponential distribution with a power law
tail in correspondence to both the bulk and tail shape of real data. These characteristic
distribution shapes are found in a wide variety of real income data, including very different
time periods and economies.
5Here and below we choose to focus exclusively upon income rather than principally because of the lack of
easily available data source for measuring wealth. The wealth data that is available tends to be qualitatively very
similar to income data, only with a lower exponent in the tail distribution, indicating higher inequality (Sinha and
Chakrabarti [2012]).
6 Zero intelligence agents are also used in economics. The goal there is to differentiate effects due to the
market mechanism, and effects due to trader strategy: if a phenomenon shows up even when the agents enter into
transactions at random, then the phenomenon is due to market effects only Ladley [2013]. In both economics and
in econophysics, the behaviour of zero intelligence agents is not taken to represent that of real economic actors.
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Figure 1: Illustration of ‘stylised fact’ of an exponential distribution with a power-law tail that
is found within a wide variety of real income data. Plot is log-log.
One might, in fact, consider an exponential distribution with a power law tail (see Figure 1)
as the key ‘stylised fact’ of income distributions, akin to those that are of central concern
within the econophysics of financial markets. Stylised facts are sets of ‘properties, common
across many instruments, markets and time periods’ (Cont [2001], p.223) and recovery the
stylised fact of power-law distributions is taken to be one of (but not the only) chief
achievements of econophysics. Despite this impressive correspondence with real data, kinetic
exchange models of income have come under attack. Such attacks are not just from
economists hostile to econophysics per se, rather some see kinetic exchange models as part of
a ‘worrying trend’ in econophysics, that should be corrected. Such models, we are told, are
‘not like [an] economic exchange process, but more like a burglar process. People randomly
meet and one just beats up the other and takes their money’ (Hogan [2005]). Moreover, the
models involve an exchange process that:
[Would] hardly be imaginable as both agents would rather prefer not to
participate in this game of a burglar economy - at least if they possess a minimum
degree of risk aversion. The model, thus, is not in harmony with the principle of
voluntary participation of agents in the hypothesized process which economists
would consider to be an important requirement for a valid theory of exchange
activities. Lux ([2005]).
In more general and precise terms, the ‘Worrying Trends’ line of criticism runs as follows:
There is a general (and understandable) tendency on the part of
econophysicists to develop theoretical models, which are based on the principles
of statistical physics. We obviously recognise that all theories are approximations
to reality. In certain specific economic applications, models constructed on this
basis may very well be valid. But in general this is most definitely not the case,
and models constructed on these principles ignore absolutely fundamental
features of economic reality. Any congruence obtained with the data by such
models is therefore spurious. The main problems with translating statistical
physics models into economics are
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1. these are essentially exchange-only models of economic and financial
processes, which take no account of production,
2. they often lead to a confusion of basic concepts, in particular the concepts of
transactions and of income.
(Gallegati et al. [2006], p.4)
It is not the accuracy of the models in recovering real data that is in question: rather,
Gallegati et al. ([2006]) are primarily engaged in a methodological attack on the idealisations
involved in these models. They argue that kinetic exchange type models for income
distributions are inherently problematic or illegitimate on the grounds that their treatment of
production, income and transactions is in conflict with ‘economic reality’. In what follows we
will consider two simple but important kinetic exchange models in detail, and assess what
warrant, if any, such criticisms should be given.
2 Modelling Inequality
2.1 Mainstream Economic Models for Income Distribution
The problem of modelling income distributions within societies is certainly not a peripheral
issue in the history of economics, and was much discussed long before than advent of
econophysics. Consider, for example, the following quote from David Ricardo,7 one of the
founders of classical economics:
The produce of earth—all that is derived from its surface by the united application
of labour, machinery and capital, is divided among three classes of the
community, namely, the proprietor of the land, the owner of the stock or capital
necessary for its cultivation, and the labourers by whose industry it is cultivated.
But in different stages of society, the proportions of the whole produce of the
earth which will be allotted to each of these classes, under the names of rent,
profit and wages, will be essentially different[...]To determine the laws which
regulate this distribution is the principal problem in Political Economy.
Of particular importance, from the perspective of contemporary macro-economics, are models
that seek to explain the structure and evolution of income distributions in more economically
developed countries in terms of the idea of ‘marginal productivity’ and the ‘race between
technology and education’.8 The essential idea, dating back to Tinbergen ([1975]), is to
consider a situation where individuals within a population have different levels of education
leading to different levels of skill. As technology progresses the demand for higher and higher
skill levels increases. This is because workers who perform higher skilled jobs are understood
to make a greater personal contribution to the output of the company for which they work;
they have higher marginal productivity. Since they are in greater demand such workers can
secure higher wages than those with less education. Given that there is educational progress
with a society, over a period of time the education level, and thus skill level, of the workers at
the bottom will increase. If there is little technological progress for a long period of time and
everyone eventually reaches a level of education sufficient to have the skills to perform any
7From the preface to his 1817 ‘On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation’, as quoted by Atkinson
and Bourguignon ([2000])
8For more details on the practice of modelling income inequality within contemporary macro-economics (and
micro-economics) see Atkinson and Bourguignon ([2000]) and Bertola et al. ([2014])
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job, then the society will tend towards equality of wages. Conversely, if the pace of
technological change far outstrips the pace of educational development, then the wages of a
highly educated elite will become extremely high, and overall income inequality will increase.
Such models make use of a range of idealising assumptions, not least the idea of competitive
equilibrium markets that has been subjected to criticism from various perspectives (including
from econophysics). They do, however, provide valuable insights into possible explanations
for aspects of the structure and evolution of income distributions, when understood purely in
terms of wages. As such it seems very difficult to consider them as entirely without value,
even if they neglect important structural, institutional and cultural factors.
As emphasised in the Ricardo quote above, when we are considering income of individuals
within an economy we must of course also consider income from ‘capital’ in addition to
waged labour. The definition of the concept of ‘capital’ is a subtle issue. In an influential
account, Piketty ([2014]) gives the definition of capital as ‘the sum total of nonhuman assets
that can be owned and exchanged on some market’ (p.46).9 According to Piketty ([2014]),
from a historical perspective return on capital has typically occupied a significant share of
total income. And furthermore, on Piketty’s view, capital is of particular importance to income
inequality since, in times of low economic and demographic growth, is the principal factor
driving increasing income inequality. The basic idea is as follows. Consider an economy
where the rate of return on capital is significantly larger than the growth rate for a long period
of time (for example nineteenth century Europe). In such circumstances, if people with
inherited wealth save a proportion of their income from capital, then their capital will grow
faster than the economy as a whole. Overall this will mean that income from capital will grow
faster than waged income and thus, since capital is very unequally spread within the
population, the distribution of income will tend to diverge. Such focus upon the historical
context and macroeconomic mechanisms of income inequality seems ideally suited to
addressing particular culturally and historically contingent questions. These are not, however,
the only questions one would like to ask about the distributions of incomes.
In particular, irrespective of the nuances behind the income distributions that obtain in
particular countries in particular epochs, it is still legitimate to try and find general features of
economic interactions that explain (relatively stable) qualitative features such as the ‘stylised
fact’ discussed above. The important point, that we will return to in Section 5, is that the
idealisations one makes in order to to construct a socioeconomic model (as well as the manner
in which these idealisations are justified) should be evaluated relative to the type of purposes
to which one wants to put the model. If one wants to understand the dynamics of the income
distribution in a particular country over a period of several decades with a view to motivating
policy that reduces inequality, then idealising away population growth and production is
clearly entirely inappropriate. Moreover, in such a context, recovery of qualitative ‘stylised
facts’ is of marginal importance:
When we say that a distribution of wealth is a [power-law] distribution, we have
not really said anything at all. It may be a distribution in which the upper decile
receives only slightly more than 20 percent of total income (as in Scandinavia in
1970-1980) or one in which the upper decile receives 50 percent (as in the United
States in 2000-2010)...In each case we are dealing with a [power-law]
distribution, but the coefficients are quite different...When we study inequality in
historical perspective, the important thing to explain is not the stability of the
9This definition excludes ‘human capital’ which includes an individuals skills and training. The adequacy and
consistency in application Piketty’s conception of capital has been contested. See for example Homburg ([2015]).
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distribution but the significant changes that occur from time to time.
(Piketty [2014], p.368)
This point not-with-standing, the recovery of the coefficients of power-law distribution also
requires the recover of the distribution, and so focus upon the income distributions relevant to
specific historical circumstances rather than ‘stylised facts’, does not reduce the explanatory
burden vis-à-vis the power-law. Moreover, when what we are interested in is the question of
why the tail of income distributions follows a power-law stably across time and space, then it
does seem appropriate to use a highly idealised framework where we do not attempt to model
the factors that determine the relevant coefficients.10 The question of whether or not such
models can be usefully applied in the context of designing inequality-reducing policy will be
considered in Section 5
To conclude our discussion of income models within mainstream economics we will briefly
consider a family of stochastic models that recover the power-law behaviour in stable income
distributions. Most significant is the model of Champernowne ([1953]).11 This model is built
within a dynamic version of the general equilibrium framework and has the feature that the
entire distribution tends towards a power-law distribution under certain fairly general
conditions. Champernowne-type models bear a strong resemblance to the kinetic exchange
models that are the focus of our analysis. In particular, the stochasticity that they incorporate
is primitive, and not related to individual optimising behaviour. As we saw in the previous
section, such features have been harshly criticised in the econophysics case on the grounds
that they conflict with basic premisses of economic theory. Similarly, we find comments on
the Champernowne approach such as:
From the economist’s point of view, perhaps the most unsatisfactory feature of the
stochastic models...is that they shed no light on the economics of the distribution
process....it is difficult to see how the factor of individual choice can be
disregarded in analysing personal income distribution. (Mincer [1958], p. 283)
These remarks are very similar to the ‘burglar economics’ line of criticism that we saw
levelled at the kinetic exchange models, only presented in a more moderate manner. For this
reason we will not here conduct any detailed analysis of the stochastic models of income in
economics and their relation to kinetic exchange models in econophysics. The reader is
referred to Chakrabarti et al. ([2013])[§7.2] for some efforts in this regard.
2.2 Econophysics Models for Income Distribution
There is a suggestive analogy between the emergence of stable income distributions in
economic systems, and the emergence of stable kinetic energy distributions in statistical
mechanical systems. Yet it is not, at first hand, at all obvious that such an analogy should be
extendable to a deep structural similarity between the models that can accurately describe
such systems. There is some pedigree to such an expectation, however. For instance, we can
find the great mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot (Mandelbrot [1960]) opining:
10 This is a general strategy: if a phenomenon occurs in multiple contexts, your model ought not appeal to de-
tails specific to a particular context. Thus, more idealised, more abstract models are useful when the phenomenon
is multiply realised.
11 See also Wold and Whittle ([1957]), Brown ([1976]) and Chakrabarti et al. ([2013], §7.2). Economics
model involving power laws in other contexts are considered in Kesten ([1973]), Gabaix ([1999]), Gabaix et al.
([2005]).
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There is a great temptation to consider the exchanges of money which occur in
economic interaction as analogous to the exchanges of energy which occur in
physical shocks between gas molecules. In the loosest possible terms, both kinds
of interactions should lead to similar states of equilibrium. That is, one should be
able to explain the law of income distribution by a model similar to that used in
statistical thermodynamics.
What happens if we take Mandelbrot’s intuition at face value, and simply press ahead in an
attempt to explain ‘the law of income distribution’ using ‘a model similar to that used in
statistical thermodynamics’? A surprising, and relatively recent, achievement of econophysics
is the construction of viable ‘gas-like’ models for income distribution. Here we will introduce
the most basic such model, the ‘DY’ model of Draˇgulescu and Yakovenko [2000], and assess
the relationship with its statistical mechanical analogue. In Section 4 we will consider more
sophisticated kinetic exchange models in the context of the ‘stylised facts’ found within real
income data.
The starting point for the DY model is a population of ‘zero-intelligence’ agents. These
agents have a single property: their money. At any given time t an agent i has associated with
them a single property, their monetary income mi(t) (which is always non-negative, so debt is
not allowed). In the DY model one first assumes a large population (i.e. N agents, with
N >> 1), and then randomly selects two individuals at some time t. For our two chosen
agents, the initial pre-interaction state can be characterised completely in terms of two
numbers: mi(t) which is the income of agent i at time t; and m j(t) which is the income of agent
j at time t. Following our guiding Mandelbrotian intuition, we model all interactions in the
population in terms of binary exchanges of money in the same way as in the kinetic theory of
gases one can treat the interaction between molecules in a gas in terms of binary exchanges of
kinetic energy.12 However, unlike in the kinetic theory case we do not have dynamical
principles dictating how the initial conditions of the agents determine the nature of the
collision. Rather in the agent-agent ‘collision’ all the money of the two agents is pooled, and
then a random fraction is given to one, and the rest to the other. This simple exchange
mechanism thus leads to a post-interaction state characterised by:
mi(t + 1) = mi(t) + ∆m (2.1)
m j(t + 1) = m j(t) − ∆m (2.2)
where
∆m = ǫi jm j(t) + (1 − ǫi j)mi(t) (2.3)
with ǫi j a random variable uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, and labelled by the index of
the two agents in the interaction (i.e. agents i and j). Although the model only includes binary
interactions, at each time-step we resample the two agents that are interacting from our
population. This, together with the randomisation of the fractional monetary exchange, means
that at late times, t → ∞, the distribution of incomes within the population should be
‘well-mixed’. A crucial feature to note is that in this model both the total number of agents, N,
and the total amount of money, M =
∑
imi(0), are held fixed.
13 This is in exact
correspondence to the conservation of number of molecules and total energy in the kinetic
theory of gases. Following Banerjee and Yakovenko ([2010]), we can characterise a
12The comparison that is particularly pertinent here is with Boltzmann’s original 1872 model Boltzmann
([1970]).
13 That is,
∑
i mi(0) =
∑
i mi(t) for all t.
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Figure 2: The DY exchange dynamics (after Chakrabarti et al. [2013], Figure 4.1, p.56)
probability distribution for money using bins of width m⋆ labelled by the index k. We let Nk
be the number of agents with income between mk and mk + m⋆, so the probability for an agent
to be in the kth bin, is just P(mk) =
Nk
N
. Holding the resolution m⋆ fixed, the income
distribution is thus characterised entirely by a set of occupation numbers, Nk for the bins. The
simple combinatorial expression for the number of distinct placements of the agents that
preserves the same set of occupation numbers is:
Ω =
N!
N1!N2!N3!...
(2.4)
We can then define entropy as the natural logarithm of this quantity, S = lnΩ, and then look
for a distribution that maximises entropy. The origins and status of such a principle of
maximum entropy is a subtle and complex issue that would require a lengthly treatment to be
dealt with adequately. Here we will simply note there is a general correspondence between the
probability distribution which maximizes the entropy and the frequency distribution which can
be realized in the greatest number of ways Jaynes ([2003]). For further details, on the
relationship between entropy maximisation and stable probability distributions the interested
reader is referred to the discussions of Frank ([2009]) and Lyon [2011, 2013].
The definition of entropy as S = lnΩ reflects this correspondence. A large N approximation
together with a little analytical work Banerjee and Yakovenko ([2010])[p.4] then leads us to
the distribution:
P(mk) =
Nk
N
= e−
(mk−µ)
T (2.5)
with T = M
N
and µ = −T ln T
m⋆
. This is of course identical to the Maxwell-Botzmann speed
distribution for molecules in an ideal gas with, in that case, T the temperature and µ the
chemical potential. The same distribution is produced at late times via Monte Carlo
simulations (Chakrabarti et al. [2013]) given a suitably large N, implying that the model is in
fact entropy maximising on a suitable timescale. So this simple model captures the stylised
fact that the bulk of the income distribution is an exponential distribution.14
14Gallegati et al. ([2006]) note that there is some controversy over whether the bulk of the income distribution
is exponential or lognormal. Wiens ([1999]) points out that the gamma distribution (of which exponential distribu-
tions are a special case) can also look a lot like a lognormal in some circumstances, and so this is a difficult thing
to determine. Chakrabarti et al. ([2013]) seem to talk as if the choice of one or the other of these distributions
is almost a matter of discipline-specific preference (p.2): they claim that economists prefer the lognormal, while
statisticians and physicists prefer gamma distributions.
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3 Idealisations in Kinetic Exchange Models
We have just seen that by taking the kinetic theory analogy seriously, and constructing an
income exchange model along very similar lines to kinetic exchange models, we can derive a
distribution for incomes of the same exponential form as that used in the paradigmatic model
of gases. The comparison between kinetic exchange models of income and gases in fact
proves to be particularly enlightening. In both cases what we are dealing with are heavily
idealised models. Intuitively speaking, an idealised assumption is a ‘literally false’ assumption
about the target system. It is literally false because, for instance, it leaves out a feature that the
target system actually has, or it ascribes a feature to the target system that it actually lacks.
Various accounts of idealisation exist within the philosophical literature (Ladyman [2013]).
For the time being we will, so far as is possible, remain neutral between these accounts and
focus upon (prima facie) literally false assumptions that require special justification. In
Section 5 we will return to question of the interpretations of idealization and consider a
number of contemporary accounts.
Gas Income
Feature 1 Multi-molecule interactions Multi-agent interactions
Idealisation 1 Binary interactions Binary interactions
Feature 2 Molecules have chemical
properties
Agents have memory and
expectations
Idealisation 2 Molecules are hard spheres Agents have zero intelli-
gence
Feature 3 Conservation of total energy Production of money
Idealisation 3 No idealisation necessary Conservation of total money
Feature 4 Conservation of total
molecule number
Growth of population
Idealisation 4 No idealisation necessary Conservation of total agent
number
Feature 5 Not all kinetic energy is ex-
changeable via linear mo-
mentum transfer
Not all money is exchange-
able via random redistribu-
tion
Idealisation 5 All kinetic energy is transla-
tional
All money is exchangeable
via random redistribution
Feature 6 Molecules have intrinsic dif-
ferences besides their speed
Agents have intrinsic differ-
ences besides their income
Idealisation 6 Molecules are identical Agents are identical
Table 1: Comparison of Idealisations in Gas and Income Models
If we consider in particular the 1872 Boltzmann kinetic model (Boltzmann [1970], Emch
and Liu [2002], Uffink [2014]) we can make a specific comparison between some of the key
idealisations involved in income and gas kinetic exchange models. This list given in Table 1 is
by no means meant to be exhaustive. Rather its function is to illustrate that in both cases
idealisations relating to specific features of the real systems are made, and in both cases these
idealisations vary in their type and degree of justification. Moreover, although not complete,
our particular selection of idealisations has been engineered to enable a comparison between
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the allegedly problematic idealisations of kinetic exchange inequality model, and those in the
kinetic theory of gases which have widespread support.
3.1 Binary Interactions
Arguably the most important idealisation in both cases is that all interactions are binary. In the
gas case in particular we find statements such as: ‘The legitimate neglect of all but binary
encounters in a gas is one of the important simplifications that have enabled the theory of gases
to attain its present high development’ (Chapman and Cowling [1991], p.3). The idealisation
of there being only two-particle collisions amounts to saying that interactions involving more
than two particles can be neglected. Where does the legitimacy of this simplifying assumption
derive from? The answer to this question is different for gases and economic exchange.
In the case of a gas we have a relatively straightforward answer. The justification is in terms
of a particular density of the gas: low enough that collisions involving three or more
molecules are very rare, but not so low that two molecule collisions don’t happen. On the one
hand, encounters with other molecules should occupy a very small, but not negligible, part of
the lifetime of a molecule, meaning that binary collisions are overwhelming more likely than
three or more molecule collisions. On the other hand, the dynamics of the model also requires
that binary collisions within the population of molecules that make up the gas should not be so
rare that the average distance travelled before a collisions (the ‘mean free path’) is comparable
to the dimensions of the container. It is a contingent fact that real gases within the physical
circumstances relevant for experiments on earth actually are in such density regimes. But
given this contingent condition holds, it is approximately true that only two-particle collisions
occur in gases. An additional justification of the idealisation is instrumentalist in spirit and is
based on the (empirical) success of the model: without the binary interaction limit holding in
at least some instantiations of the target gas system the original Boltzmannian model, as well
as its more sophisticated modern cousins, would neither be particularly practically useful nor
empirically adequate.
With regard to the binary interactions idealisation, income exchange models are
significantly different from the gas model. The difference between the two models concerns
the justification of the idealised assumptions in each model: unlike in the case of the gas
model, there is no straightforward and precisely quantifiable justification of the all important
binary interaction idealisation for income exchange models. If this idealisation is to be
justified one would expect that the manner of this justification must be rather different. In an
economic system there is no sensible analogue for the ‘density’ where binary agent-agent
interactions dominate, and no real basis to expect that the kind of complex economic systems
that the model is intended (in some sense) to represent will actually be dominated by the
binary interactions.
Here we should make two important comments regarding the dialectic between the
economists and the econophysicists. First, binary interactions are not among the supposedly
problematic idealisations mentioned in Gallegati et al. ([2006]). Their critique primarily
derives from a comparison between the kinetic exchange income model, and the concepts
used in mainstream economics models. We think this illustrates the virtue of our approach:
when studying the idealisations within econophysics models it is highly instructive to consider
the idealisations made in related physics models. This first point notwithstanding, we think the
case of binary interactions idealisations well illustrates the general worry that Gallegati et al.
([2006]) clearly have in mind: when importing models from physical science into social
science, one must be aware that the justifications for the relevant idealisations will not always
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(or even usually) come with them. Arguments must be given in order for the models to be
‘sanctioned’ in their new context (Winsberg [1999]).
So, to what extent can a binary interactions idealisation be justified for agents rather than
particles? One option would be as follows: agents are unlike particles in that ‘three-body’
interactions can be decomposed into sequences of ‘two body’ interactions. In this way
monetary exchanges involving three individuals might be suitably approximated by sequences
of exchanges involving two agents. On the face of it, this argument seems rather plausible, and
we should note that many mainstream economic models also assume all interactions are
binary. However, from a game theoretic perspective, it does seem that three player interactions
are importantly different from games involving only two players (von Neumann and
Morgenstern [1944], e.g. chapter 5). Thus, at this stage, it is not clear that the binary
interaction assumption is justified for the case of kinetic exchange income models. At the
least, we lack any strong arguments that the non-binary nature of real economic interactions is
‘explanatorily irrelevant’ when we consider the distributions of incomes in a economy. We
will return to the question of whether or not the problems in justifying the binary interaction
idealisation should be taken to undermine the value of kinetic exchange models in Section
Section 5.
3.2 Conservation Principles
Let’s consider the conservation principles next. One of the main points of criticism made of
the kinetic exchange models relates to the conservation of total money and total number of
agents. This can be compared with the conservation of total energy and total number of
molecules. In a gas the conservation of energy is not an idealisation: it is a fundamental
physical principle. Similarly, the conservation of molecule number in a real gas can be
justified based upon physical principles (e.g. conservation of mass or some form of
correspondence principle). For an economic system, on the other hand, money is usually
understood to be produced over time, and migration, birth and death certainly do occur. Thus,
the conservation principles which could be taken as non-idealised in the gas model case, must
reasonably be considered idealisations for the income exchange model. The conservation of
money idealisation is of particular relevance for the dialectic between the economists and
econophysicists that featured in our introduction: it is one of the ‘absolutely fundamental
features of economic reality’ that is ‘ignored’ in the exchange models. The money supply is,
furthermore, closely connected to economic production, and so the conservation of money is
doubly unrealistic.
A seemingly straightforward justification for both the conservation idealisations in the
econophysics case runs as follows: Chakrabarti et al. ([2013], p.56) argue that since the time
scale for the agent-agent collisions (the ‘timestep timescale’) is much shorter than that in
which economic growth or migration take place, neglecting such features is a reasonable
approximation. This is despite the fact that the timescale of the distribution described by the
full model run could reasonably be considered that of long time, population level effects; for
instance economic growth and demographic change. This justificatory strategy invites further
critical questions: (i) whether money conservation is a legitimate approximation on the
timestep timescale; and if so (ii) whether such a short time scale conservation idealisation is
undermined by non-conservation on the timescale of the model run.
Critical question (i). With regard to the timestep timescale idealisation and money
conservation, there are some grounds to be skeptical. McCauley ([2006]) argues that money is
created and destroyed rapidly, ‘with the tap of a computer key’, via credit, and that, on these
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grounds, ‘conservation of money is a silly assumption’. But are such considerations enough to
invalidate the collision models built upon conservation of money? If one considers real figures
for annual money growth then the overall creation and destruction of money is only, by
percentage, of the order of double digit changes per year (IMF [2014]). This would average
out to very small changes at the timescale of the economic interactions of real agents (i.e.
minutes). Even if, strictly speaking, money is created and destroyed on the timestep timescale
it does not seem an unreasonable approximation to assume money conservation on such
timescales. One could understand this as a contingent fact about actual economies in the same
way as we understood the contingent fact that binary interactions dominate in the gas pressure
regimes of interest. However, one might instead think that it is almost constitutive of a
functioning economy that annual growth is moderate: a currency experiencing hyperinflation,
or hyperdeflation would no longer serve as a useful means of exchange. That said, clearly
there are some real financial events that happen over relatively short timescales, and yet could
dramatically affect the money supply, for example a surprise injection of reserves by a central
bank. The question is then, whether the money supply is ‘sticky’ enough that the effects of
such ‘money growth shocks’ still spread relativity slowly, and thus are only important over
timescales large relative to the timestep timescale. These are difficult issues and it would
radically overstep the remit of this paper to attempt to settle them here.15 We will only point
out that the question of whether or not the assumption of money conservation on timestep
timescales is reasonable is a subtle one.
Critical question (ii). This brings us to the second part of our question, whether a legitimate
timestep scale conservation idealisation is undermined by non-conservation on the timescale
of the full model run. The crucial point is that by the ‘timescale of the full model run’ we
should mean the timescale of the relaxation to the equilibrium distribution within the model,
rather than the timescale of the stable income distribution data. If the timescale of relaxation is
short enough that money is approximately conserved, then that idealisation within the
collision model should be understood to be well justified. On the other hand, if relaxation
takes enough time for the growth in money to be appreciable, then the idealisation seems
dubious. This essentially amounts to the question of whether we should understand the growth
of money supply as something which happens much slower than the relaxation to equilibrium
in the distribution of income. The point is that, unless the growth of money supply has this
property, there are good reasons to doubt the applicability of any argument towards an
equilibrium distribution, just like in a non-adiabatic transformation of a gas. These are subtle
and difficult questions, and again we will not attempt any kind resolution here. Rather we will
simply note that the question of timescales and legitimacy of money conservation idealisations
appears to be much more subtle than either of the sides in the debate appreciate. If these issues
are crucial in passing judgement over these models, one way or another, then they must be
considered in more detail.
One interesting line of reasoning that might allow the defenders of kinetic models of
income to blunt criticisms based upon the non-conservation of money runs as follows. If it is
distribution of relative incomes that is the ‘stylised fact’ we are trying to explain, then what
really matters is relative rather than absolute monetary amounts. In that case, we could take
the ‘money’ that is being exchanged in kinetic exchange models to really be units of relative
income or purchasing power. And in that case, overall conservation of ‘money’ is not just a
reasonable approximation, it is actually genuinely the case since the total units of relative
income within the population will be conserved over time. The fact that the money supply
within real economies grows would simply not be relevant: if it is relative income inequality
15See Christiano ([1994]), Walsh ([2010]).
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we are trying to model, then what matters clearly is relative rather than absolute income. In
this vein we should note that it is relative rather than absolute inequality that, at least in more
developed economies, can be connected to social harm (Wilkinson et al. [2011]), thus viewing
the models in terms of relative income inequality would not necessarily blunt their normative
implications. However, such a strategy would involve quite a radical re-interpretation of the
models. It would also serve to conflate the absolute and relative income concepts: ideally we
would like models of the absolute income from which we can calculate the relative income.
We will leave this the question of whether the kinetic exchange models could be interpreted in
terms of relative income also open for further analysis.
3.3 Exchange Dynamics
Recall that the statistical mechanics and econophysics models both involve simple particles or
agents that have only one property. For the DY model of income this property is money.
Despite its simplicity the DY exchange process does share some important features with real
exchanges: in a real exchange (ignoring taxes), the amount of money one agent has increases
exactly as much as the other agent’s money decreases. Of course, typically some goods or
services travel in the opposite direction to the money, but if we were just focusing on the
distribution of money then what matters is that one agent is poorer and one richer. Chakrabarti
et al. ([2013]) also discuss similar models with commodities, but we don’t need to discuss that
here. So even though real interactions are very far removed from the interactions of the kinetic
exchange model, the dynamics do capture one important feature of real interactions. What is
striking is that it appears that this is all that is required to capture at least some of the stylised
facts about the aggregate distribution of income. As Yakovenko and Rosser ([2009]) put it:
[The DY model] only keeps track of money flow, and does not keep track of
what goods and services are delivered. One reason for this is that many goods,
e.g. food and other supplies, and most services, e.g. getting a haircut disappear
after consumption. Because they are not conserved, and also because they are
measured in different physical units, it is not very practical to keep track of them.
In contrast, money is measured in the same unit. . . and is conserved in local
transactions, so it is straightforward to keep track of money flow. It is also
important to realize that an increase in material production does not produce an
automatic increase in money supply. The agents can grow apples on trees, but
cannot grow money on trees. Only a central bank has the monopoly on changing
the monetary base.
For the gas case the single property playing the same role as money is translational kinetic
energy, which, since all molecules in the model have identical mass, is given simply by speed.
For polyatomic gases at least, a substantial fraction of molecular energy resides in modes
other than translational kinetic energy (Poling et al. [2001]). For instance, there can be
intra-molecular vibrational and rotational kinetic energy related to the internal molecular
structure (there can also be energy related to inter-molecular rotations and vibrations). What is
more, real collisions in such gases can involve transfer between such internal degrees of
freedom and the translational modes, and such transfers play an important role in determining
the outcome of a binary collision between molecules (provided the temperature is not too low)
(Trusler [2011]). Consider the analogy of the simplified Boltzmann system: the particles in
the gas model are frictionless, and they are not spinning, so when they bounce into each other,
the only change that occurs is changes to the speed (and direction) of travel. If real spheres
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(with friction) were to bump into each other, there would be transfers of rotational energy as
well: a glancing hit would cause the spheres to spin more than they did before collision.
We thus see that the elastic transfers of translational momentum that are fundamental to the
Boltzmann kinetic exchange model are also heavily idealised exchange processes. There are
some monatomic gases (for example, noble gases) that can approximately be taken to possess
no internal energy communicable via collisions, and for these gases the Boltzmann model
does give a good fit to data on many thermodynamic properties (Chapman and Cowling
[1991], §12-14). Thus, one could restrict the target systems relevant to the Boltzmann model
to be monatomic gases, and take the idealisation that all kinetic energy is exchangeable via
linear momentum transfer to be justified as a legitimate approximation to the real collisions.
However, one could also take a different route: even if the idealisation is not an approximation
to the exchanges in the target (gases in general, including polyatomic gases) this does not
invalidate the model. Rather it opens up natural avenues for ‘de-idealisations’ that take into
account more of the features that in fact make a difference to the behaviour of the target
system. In other words, we may take the idealisations to be Galilean idealisations whose
simplicity is a pragmatic virtue but may ultimately be removed by ‘de-idealising’ the model in
question (see McMullin [1985], Cartwright [1989]). More specifically we can refine the
‘smooth hard sphere collision’ exchange mechanism to include dynamical features that better
take account of relevant features of real collisions. Following, Chapman and Cowling ([1991],
§11), for example we can consider a model for polyatomic gases that was proposed soon after
Boltzmann’s original paper. In the ‘Bryan-Pidduck’ model (Bryan ([1894]), Pidduck [1922])
we consider ‘rough’ elastic spherical molecules that possess rotational energy and are such
that in a collision the relative velocity of the spheres at their point of impact is exactly
reversed. In such models we have increased transport of rotational energy since rough spheres
will knock back molecules with which they collide whilst at the same time transferring part of
their rotational energy to them. Although not a more realistic representation of collisions in a
polyatomic gas, this adaptation of the Boltzmann model leads to an idealisation which more
closely approximates real exchanges in the sense that it better approximates the effects of the
features that have been idealised away.
With this story in mind, consider the analogue ‘exchange idealisation’ in the econophysics
case. A feature of real economic agents is that typical monetary exchanges do not relate to the
entirety of an agent’s income. Agents have other assets that are not captured in the randomised
exchange process: just like molecules have other forms of kinetic energy not captured in the
linear momentum transfer exchange process. Only in extreme examples would a real
interaction between two agents involve all the money of the agents. Thus one idealisation
involved in the DY model is that the agent-agent ‘collisions’ allow for such total exchanges of
money. Just like in the Boltzmannian case it is difficult to justify this idealization as a
legitimate approximation to real interactions without severely limiting the target systems to
which we want to apply the model. However, just like in the Boltzmannian case this does not
invalidate the model rather it is promising to initially treat the model as containing a Galilean
idealization which, then, gives us a natural starting point for developing a new more realistic
model (through de-idealisation of the old model). And this is what econophysicists in fact do:
one simple strategy for ‘de-idealising’ the DY-model is to allow agents to ‘save’ money by
only putting a certain proportion of their total money in the pot to be randomly exchanged
during ‘collisions’ (Chakrabarti et al. [2013]). Like the rough spheres and polyatomic gases
example, this need not be an adjustment that makes the model representationally more
accurate. Rather it may produce a model where the refined idealisations better approximate
the effects of the features that have been idealised away. In the following section we will see
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that such a simple adjustment to the model can have very significant effects on the match
between the stable income distribution and real data.
4 Fat Tails and Savings
In the previous section we occupied ourselves with a particular simple model for the
emergence of income distributions in economic systems. Here we will consider a slightly
more sophisticated variant of the ‘collision’ model, called the CCM model. In fact,
econophysicists have proposed a strategy to de-idealise the assumption that all money is
exchangeable (i.e. by allowing savings, see Section 4 below); interestingly, this specific
idealisation is already sufficient to alter the shape of the stable income distribution. Most
significantly, this new distribution is claimed to match that observed in real data more closely:
not only does the distribution match the bulk, but it also gets the fat tail right. The implications
of such a ‘congruence’ with real data for the evaluation of the status of these models will be
considered in the following section.
Following Chakrabarti et al. ([2013]) we can characterise the observed regularities in real
income distributions as follows: if P(x)dx is the probability that a randomly chosen individual
within a population is found to have a income between x and x + dx, then the functional form
of P(x) is:
P(x) ≈ xne
−x
T for x < xc (4.1)
P(x) ≈ x−α−1 for x ≥ xc (4.2)
where n and α are two exponents and T is a scaling factor. The distribution for x < xc is an
exponential distribution and has as a special case the Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution familiar
from physics of classical gases at equilibrium. This connection between income distributions
and the kinetic theory of gasses was of course exemplified by the models considered in the
previous section. The distribution for x ≥ xc is also of a well known form. It is a power law or
Pareto distribution. Typically, empirical data imply a value for xc such that around 90% of the
population follows the exponential distribution, and around 10% the Pareto distribution. Since
the Pareto distribution characteristically drops off more slowly than the exponential
distribution, income distributions display a ‘fat tail’ effect similar to those studied in other
areas of econophysics, particularly financial markets.16
Given that we accept the evidence in favour of real income distributions displaying the
‘stylised fact’ of a bulk exponential distribution and a power law tail, is such a distribution
recoverable from collision type models like those considered in the previous section? The
prima facie surprising answer is, yes. What is more the only modification to the DY model
required to reproduce the power-law tail is the addition of a saving propensity to the agents.
Explicitly, following Chakrabarti et al. ([2013]), we introduce a parameter λi which
corresponds to a ‘savings propensity’ of the ith agent. Our collision dynamics now follow the
adjusted equations:
mi(t + 1) = mi(t) + ∆m (4.3)
m j(t + 1) = m j(t) − ∆m (4.4)
where
∆m = (1 − λ j)ǫi jm j(t) − (1 − λi)(1 − ǫi j)mi(t) (4.5)
16Mitzenmacher ([2003]) points out that power law distributions and lognormal distributions often look very
similar, and summarises the history of this thought in a number of disciplines.
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Figure 3: The CCM dynamics (after Chakrabarti et al. [2013], Figure 4.1, p.56)
The effect of the savings propensity is thus to treat the agents as putting some fraction of their
money aside before the collision, so that that they each only put a fraction of 1− λi into the pot
to be randomly distributed. Although the equations of this ‘CCM’ model are only slightly
more complicated than the DY model, these complications render an analytical solution much
less tractable (although see Chakraborti and Patriarca [2009]). Rather, such models are
typically studied using ‘Monte Carlo’ simulations. Such simulations give a steady state
distribution that, for suitably large N and t, and a heterogeneous distribution of λi and mi,
reproduces the relevant stylised fact: i.e. bulk exponential and power-law tail.
5 Evaluation
The starting point of our analysis was the question of whether or not kinetic exchange models
for income represent (in some sense) examples of an illegitimate or inherently problematic
modelling practice. In the previous sections we have analysed two such models in detail, and
made what we hope is an instructive comparison with the basic Boltzmannian kinetic model
of gases. The broad conclusion of our analysis thus far is that when the same (or very similar)
model is applied in different modelling contexts the idealised features that are in common (or
very similar) may be sanctioned by very different justificatory arguments. The conservation
assumption in the exchange models in an example of this.
A second, rather general, conclusion is that it does not seem particularly plausible to take a
model to be invalidated simply by the fact that it involves idealising features with no
representational correspondence to ‘reality’. Call ‘naïve representationalism’ the view that
holds with respect to a model m if and only if all features of model m, including the idealised
ones, can be interpreted as bearing a correspondence (or, at least an approximate
correspondence) to features of the target system. Within naïve representationalism the only
legitimate idealisations are approximations, i.e. approximate correspondences between model
and features of the target system. With good reason, such a restrictive view on models and
idealisation is not particularly popular within the philosophical literature; although see Norton
([2012]) for related arguments. As we saw above, even in the case of the gas model we have
idealising assumptions that cannot be straightforwardly interpreted as approximately true.
Clearly, under naïve representationalism the econophysics models would be judged as
inherently problematic, but so would most of modelling in physical science! Our analysis thus
adds further weight to the consensus that a more flexible view of idealisation in science is well
justified.
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At the other end of the spectrum from naïve representationalism, one might consider a
maximally permissive view of idealisations in which it is not required that any features of the
model bear an approximate correspondence to features of the target system. Rather, we
consider models such as DY and CCM to be ‘generative models’ in the sense of Frank
([2009]):
generative models can be thought of as tools by which we discover important
maximum entropy attractor distributions. Once we have found such distributions
by a generative model, we may extract the informational constraints that define
the pattern[...]The original generative model no longer has special status – our
greatest insight resides with the informational constraints that define the
maximum entropy distribution.
Given the importance of entropy maximisation to analytical understanding of the stable
distributions of both income models, this view might seem particularly attractive. It is,
however, a rather extreme position that amounts to a form of rather sparse instrumentalism
that is reminiscent, with some irony, of Milton Friedman’s economic positivism (Friedman
[1953]). In fact, one can see Frank (and arguably Friedman) as committing something akin to
what Stein ([1989]) calls ‘the fallacy of nothing but’, only in the context of social rather than
physical science. Just as we should reject a ‘trite instrumentalism’ that takes a physical theory
as ‘nothing but an instrument for calculating the outcomes of experiments’, we should not
accept that social science models are ‘nothing but’ tools for discovering the constraints that
define maximum entropy distributions. Moreover, since we are dealing with models of
inequality, which is (presumably) something we would like to diminish, then the conceptual
shallowness of ‘trite instrumentalism’ is particularly worrying. To be of any great use in
practice, social science models must give us resources for guiding policy interventions and
thus involve some form of causal or counterfactual information. In this spirit, we would follow
the insistence of Brock ([1999]) that ‘the underlying econometric identification problem of
uncovering and estimating the underlying causal data generating mechanism must be dealt
with. While scaling law type regularities give us clues, much more must be done to learn the
underlying structure.’
This brings us to two ‘intermediate’ views of idealisations that are of particular relevance to
our analysis: the ‘minimalist’ and ‘dispositionalist’ conceptions of models. According to
minimalism, idealised models truthfully represent (i) a minimal set of explanatorily relevant
factors and (ii) idealised assumptions signal that some factor is not explanatorily relevant
(Strevens ([2008]), Weisberg ([2013])). The idealised model is taken to represent all, and only,
the explanatorily relevant factors for the target phenomenon, and the model ignores, in the
form of idealised assumptions, irrelevant factors. As Strevens ([2008]) argues at length, the
idealisations in the gas model can plausibly be interpreted in accord with the minimalist
interpretation: for the gas, it does seem to be reasonable to take the idealisations discussed in
Section 3 as statements about what does not make a difference for the occurrence of the target
phenomenon. However, the same does not seem to hold for the income model. As we pointed
out above, it is far from clear that real economic features such as many-agent interactions and
growth in the money supply are ‘explanatorily irrelevant’ to the distribution of incomes. Thus,
we do not have good reasons to believe that Strevens’ version of minimalism in fact applies to
exchange models of income. This is, of course, not a knock-down against minimalism.
However, the burden of argument is on the minimalists to show that, for instance, many agent
interactions are in fact irrelevant to the core mechanism that leads to the distribution of income
we observe.
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Let us turn to dispositionalism. According to dispositionalism, idealised models truthfully
represent the disposition of a (physical or economic) system to behave, if other disturbing
causes were absent (Cartwright ([1989]), Hüttemann ([2004])). An idealised assumption
describes an often counterfactual situation in which a particular factor is absent and the target
system is isolated from the influence of that particular factor. A dispositionalist account would
assert that the DY-model describes a disposition to behave in the absence of, for instance,
many-agent interactions. Unlike the minimalist, the dispositionalist is not committed to the
claim that many-agent interactions are explanatorily irrelevant. However, the dispositionalist
faces another problem: they have to justify how the income model is applicable in ‘non-ideal’
situations, i.e. in the actually quite frequent kind of situation in which many-agent interactions
in fact occur (Earman and Roberts [1999]). Meeting this challenge is more difficult in the case
of the income model than in the case of the gas model, because, unlike in the gas model, there
are no general dynamical laws in the income model that might help us to determine what will
happen if ‘disturbing factors’ are in fact present and, thereby, guide the application of the
model in a ‘non-ideal’ situation (see Hüttemann [2014] for an elaboration of this point).
Given that we have rejected an account of the income models in terms of ‘trite
instrumentalism’, and found accommodation of the models within both the minimalist and
dispositionalist frameworks problematic, one might conclude that the ‘Worrying Trends’
criticism of these models has been justified. However, we think this is a little too fast.
Although we saw good reason to reject a ‘trite’ form of instrumentalism, we have not ruled
out a richer form of instrumentalism, powerful enough to treat models as tools for motivating
interventions. Moreover, if we accept that highly idealised ‘toy models’ (such as Schelling’s
model of segregation, the Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model or the ‘MIT’ bag model of
quantum chromodynamics) can give ‘how-possibly’ explanations of the relevant target
phenomenon, then such a ‘toy model’ account might be applicable to the DY and CCM
models also.17 Econophysics is, in the end, an example of new and innovative
cross-disciplinary field, involving the application of paradigms and tools borrowed from
theoretical and statistical physics within the social sciences. We should not, therefore, be
entirely surprised that at least some of the models of econophysics do not always comfortably
fit within existing accounts of models and idealisations in the physical and social sciences:
this might be taken to be as much of a problem for the existing accounts as it is for the
econophysics models. The econophysics of social phenomena offers new territory for
philosophers of science to explore, and the current paper in intended principally as a first
step18 in the philosophical analysis of this exciting, yet perplexing, new enterprise.
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